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Summary: The choice of an adequate exchange rate regime proves to be a highly sensi-
tive field within which the economic authorities present and confirm themselves. The 
advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, which have 
been quite relativized from the conventional point of view, together with simultaneous, 
but not synchronised effects of structural and external factors, remain permanently ques-
tioned throughout a complex process of exchange rate regime decision making. The pa-
per reflects the attempt of critical identification of the key exchange rate performances, 
with emphasis on continuous non-uniformity and (un)certainty of shelf life of a relevant 
choice.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The choice of the exchange rate regime
1 is a complex decision making process 
of economic policy makers. This decision making process incorporates the 
analysis of advantages and disadvantages of fixed vs. flexible exchange rate re-
gimes. Having these arguments in mind, the economic policy makers study rele-
vant variables that affect the considered option. Exchange rate regime option 
determiners include older (traditional) and later (contemporary) approaches. The 
analysis of different variables affecting the exchange rate regime confirms the 
attitude that international environments and characteristics of the relevant coun-
try determine the appropriate selection. The exchange rate regime option deter-
miners analysed in this paper can be classified into several key groups (Levy 
Yeyati et al, 2002): 
  The optimum currency area theory  
  Real vs. nominal shocks 
  The exchange rate anchor 
  The “impossible trinity” 
  The “currency mismatching” or “currency disparity” issue 
                                                 
∗ Department of European Economics and Business Novi Sad, Faculty of Economics Subotica: 
emilijab@eccf.su.ac.yu. The paper is the result of the research carried out within master thesis in 
the field of Exit strategies to more flexible exchange rate regimes, under the mentoring of Dejan 
Miljković.  
1 Dollarisation, foreign currency board, monetary union, adjustable parity, crawling parity, corri-
dor regime, dirty and clean foreign currency floating. Emilija Beker 
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The above listed determiners can be analysed from two perspectives: tradi-
tional and contemporary. The traditional approach includes views that have 
been present for a longer period of time in the exchange rate regime option 
analysis. This approach includes the theory of optimum currency area and nomi-
nal vs. real shocks. The contemporary approaches link the adoption of a fixed 
parity with economic policy bearing no credibility and yielding dissatisfying 
results in the establishment of macroeconomic, inflationary stability with the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor. Through eliminating capital barriers and 
forming significant capital mobility, ‘impossible trinity’ emphasises the diffi-
culty of maintaining parity with speculative impacts, including sudden capital 
inflows and outflows. The currency mismatching/disparity in denomination of 
active and passive items aggravates currency fluctuation due to fear of deprecia-
tion/devaluation. Aside from the above-mentioned traditional and contemporary 
approaches in the exchange rate regime selection, other approaches exist. A new 
aspect of study of the exchange rate choice determiners can be identified through 
differentiating between the external and structural (internal) macroeconomic per-
formances. External factors include commercial integration, shocks vulnerabil-
ity, types of shocks, and political integration. Structural (internal) factors in-
clude inflation level, level of foreign currency reserves, capital mobility, labour 
mobility and nominal flexibility and product and export diversification. 
 
2. Advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rates 
 
Making decisions about exchange rate regime options involves many arguments 
and counterarguments for application of fixed or flexible exchange rate ar-
rangements (Poirson, 2001; Frenkel, 2003; Bergsten, 1999, Haggart, 1999; 
Sachs and Larrain, 1999; Kenen, 2000; Domac at al., 2001). The inherent advan-
tages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rates need to be consid-
ered from the aspect of specific macroeconomic performance and goals of the 
relevant economy. 
 
Fixed exchange rates 
Fixed exchange rates reduce foreign currency risks in international trade and 
investment transactions. If the exchange rate is fixed and the market is confi-
dently maintained at a certain level, there is no need of market stakeholders for 
hedging from sudden exchange rate changes. Planning and predicting the proc-
ess of decision making, exercised by economic authorities, investors and eco-
nomic entities, is facilitated by economic stability that is often connected with a 
fixed exchange rate regime.  
Fixing national currency with a foreign, low-inflationary currency is an ac-
tion governments implement to achieve and maintain a low inflation rate. The Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
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credibility or monetary discipline
2 argument is emphasised in particular for 
countries with a desperate need for rapid disinflation after a hyperinflationary 
period. The exchange rate serves as a nominal anchor in the process of macro-
economic stabilisation, or disinflation. Although the governments could gain 
credibility through the implementation of a fixed exchange rate regime, an abso-
lute credibility cannot be guaranteed. The possibility of devaluation is sufficient 
for the existence of the market stakeholders' doubts, vulnerable credibility and 
speculative attack possibility. The rigidly fixed exchange rate arrangements, 
specifically monetary union, currency board, and dollarization, with either 
eliminated or reduced possibility of devaluation, are therefore favoured. 
The fixed exchange rate is more susceptible to currency crises, in other 
words, to speculative attacks. In the case of a chronic current account deficit, 
speculators begin exchanging assets in national currency to foreign currency, 
assuming currency devaluation. Sufficient foreign currency reserves in the coun-
try can be used for interventions on the foreign currency market in order to de-
fend the fixed currency parity. However, diminishing reserves is also a sign of 
weakness in currency defence, therefore providing continued speculative attacks 
on devaluation. Bubula and Otker-Robe (2003) studied the vulnerability of 
fixed, intermediate, and flexible exchange rate regimes to currency crises in the 
period from 1990 to 2000 for all IMF (International Monetary Fund) members. 
Comparing fixed, including hard and soft, parities with flexible exchange rate 
regimes, the authors conclude that fixed parities are more vulnerable than flexi-
ble exchange rates: approximately ¾ of crisis episodes in the analysed period are 
connected with fixed parities. The differentiation between soft and hard parities, 
namely the extraction of intermediate regimes, leads to the conclusion that in-
termediate regimes are most vulnerable to currency crisis. Conversely, hard pari-
ties are immune to currency crisis
3, although are not to be excluded entirely.  
The limitation in fixed exchange rate regime application is a necessity of 
parity defence in the conditions of market pressures to exert the currency de-
valuation or depreciation. Maintaining parity suggests either an interest rate in-
crease or exportation of foreign currency reserves. Eichengreen and Rose (2001) 
empirically compare the consequences on macroeconomic performance in cases 
of successful and unsuccessful fixed parity defence. The research results indicate 
that countries with unsuccessful parity defence suffer from significant output 
decrease - on the average, one year of economic growth or 3% of GNP - compa-
                                                 
2 According to Kenen (2000) monetary discipline as the argument in favour of fixed exchange rate 
regimes has three aspects: first, the aspect of monetary shocks annulling, second, credibility import 
(monetary policy of the country with hard currency) and third, the disinflation process (the appli-
cation of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor). 
3 Although the occurrence of currency crises is less likely in the regime of rigidly fixed exchange 
rates, the possibility of speculative attacks is not entirely excluded. Examples include speculative 
attacks on the Currency Board of Hong Kong during the Asian crisis in 1998, the collapse of the 
Argentinean Currency Board at the end of 2001, and the attack on the Currency Board of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1999. Emilija Beker 
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rable to countries with successful defences. However, results are valid only for a 
period of one year following the parity defence, in other words, the speculative 
attack event; subsequently, the difference in output loss between successful and 
unsuccessful defence disappears. 
The choice of a fixed exchange rate regime implies the loss of monetary 
sovereignty. The fixed exchange rate imposes restrictions to monetary policy. 
Similar to fiscal policy, monetary policy is subject to the defined fixed parity, 
due to the impracticality of budget deficit monetization policy enforcement.  
The external shocks are reflected on wages and prices. However, prices and 
wages are often rigid and do not decline easily. Labour unions and contracts 
could deteriorate wage adjustments to external shocks. This results with imbal-
ance leading to speculative attacks on relevant currency. Parity defence could be 
extremely painful and expensive for an economy. The cost of defence refers to 
restrictive monetary policy in the form of interest rate increases, making nation-
ally denominated currency assets more attractive for investors, but with simulta-
neous obstruction of domestic economic activities and recession in economy.  
In contemporary conditions of liberal capital trends, a growing consensus 
suggests a country could enjoy benefits of a fixed exchange rate only in two 
ways: through maintaining capital barriers in order to limit directly the vulner-
ability of private speculations, or accepting loan obligations aimed at parity 
maintenance, enabling confidence in monetary authorities to reject speculative 
attacks. Capital barriers reduce access of the relevant country to certain types of 
foreign investments, but despite the above-mentioned shortcoming,  there is 
growing interest in capital barrier implementation, evident in examples of Chile, 
Columbia, Malaysia, and, in somewhat different form, China and India. Another 
solution implies the acceptance of rigid regimes with the strongest credibility of 
monetary policy, specifically monetary union, dollarization, and currency 
boards. Scheme 1 presents the above-mentioned advantages, assumptions, and 
potential threats in the fixed exchange rate implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
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Scheme 1. Potential advantages, assumptions and threats of fixed exchange rate 
implementation 
 
 
The first assumption of a successfully functioning fixed exchange rate is an 
adequate parity setting at the equilibrium exchange rate level (Scheme 1). The 
exchange rate initially defined at an equilibrium level does not guarantee the 
long-term success of the fixed exchange rate arrangement. The equilibrium ex-
change rate changes with the shifts of macroeconomic performances while a 
nominal exchange rate is maintained at the initial, unrealistic level. Conse-
quently, fixed regimes are susceptible to the problem of real appreciation or 
overvalued currency; the inverse problem is rare. Scheme 2 presents problems 
that can appear from maintaining an unreal fixed parity in the sense of currency 
overvaluation. The real exchange rate appreciation causes external misbalance, 
explicitly a current account deficit. Possible reactions to monetary authorities 
include the intervention, adjustment or exchange rate control. Foreign currency 
market intervention can temporarily maintain a fixed parity, but possible threats 
exist, including depleting foreign reserves, speculative attacks, and finally, de-
valuation or a transition to flexible exchange rate arrangements. Another option 
of unreal parity maintenance is adjustment, specifically economic contraction, 
leading to internal equilibrium distortions or recession. The exchange control, as 
the third possibility, could keep the parity fixed due to capital inflow/outflow 
blocking, and therefore impossibility of the same to endanger the parity with 
speculative trends. However, capital controls have a distortion effect and cannot 
be applied for a prolonged period of time. Emilija Beker 
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If all options of maintaining an unrealistic exchange rate appreciated in real 
terms do not succeed, the economic authorities are faced with huge problems. 
This situation depends on specific variables, such as external debt, transmission 
mechanisms of the exchange rate on inflation, economic dependence on im-
ported goods, non-price competitiveness factors of export products, et cetera. 
The unsuccessful defence (the surrender of economic authorities), i.e. devalua-
tion, could results in deteriorating of internal and external balance. If the infla-
tionary exchange rate transmission mechanism is significant, the currency-
mismatching dilemma is further emphasised and the country does not fulfil the 
Marshall-Lerner criteria, the internal and external balance will simultaneously 
deteriorate.  
 
Scheme 2. Consequences of overvalued exchange rates 
OVERVALUED CURRENCY OR REAL APPRECIATION 
                             Expensive export             External disequilibria 
                             Cheap import                   (Current account deficit) 
POSSIBLE REACTION OF             POTENTIAL THREAT
  
MONETARY AUTHORITIES   
             
1) Exchange rate defence using interventions at        possible  depletion  of  for-
eign                           
    the foreign currency market   reserves  –  speculative  at-
tack -  
                                                                                     devaluation or depreciation 
2) Exchange rate defence with adjustment                  internal disequilibrium -  
(contraction) in economy                                             recession 
 
3) Exchange control and capital barriers                     distortion and temporary  
                          effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flexible exchange rates    
The flexible exchange rate is an absorption mechanism of external and domestic      
shocks. The external shock affects wages and prices in fixed exchange regimes. 
Potential effects of unsuccessful, overvalued currrency defence => Devaluation => 
Inflation through transmission mechanism => Financial colapse due to currency mismat-
ching (debts connected with foreign currency clause increase allocation provisions in nati-
onal currency) => Survival of external disequllibrium (deficit of the current account 
portion of the balance of payments) due to the unfulfilled Marshal-Lerner criteria (import 
dependence and uncompetitive export sector according to non-price competetiveness fac-
tors) => Possible simultaneous existence of internal (inflation) and external (deficit) ba-
lance. Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
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The application of flexible exchange rates result in exchange rate increases (de-
preciation) and decreases (appreciation) depending on the altered economic con-
ditions, assuming direct noting. The flexible exchange rate absorbs shocks, in-
stead of absorption through internal equilibrium objectives, such as output, em-
ployment rate, and price level. Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2003) empirically 
confirmed the argument that flexible exchange rates easily absorb the negative 
external shocks, denoted by negative changes in exchange ratios or the relations 
between export and import prices. Investigating 74 developing countries in the 
post Bretton Woods era, Broda and Broda et al. (2003) confirm better absorption 
of external shocks of deteriorated trade relations in flexible regimes in compari-
son with fixed regimes. The deteriorated trade relations significantly affect the 
real output in fixed regimes contrary to flexible regimes, where the nominal ex-
change rate ‘absorbs’ the external shock. Broda concludes that the real exchange 
rate is depreciated momentarily and significantly in a flexible regime, while in a 
fixed regime, the real depreciation is insignificant and occurs two years later. 
Negative external shocks in a fixed regime are deflationary, while it is inflation-
ary in a flexible regime. It has been proven that 10% of deterioration in trade 
ratios, or a decrease of export prices, induces the average decrease of real output 
that is approximately 1,7% higher in fixed, compared to flexible, regimes. 
Flexible exchange rates imply autonomy of monetary policy and greater 
flexibility of macroeconomic policy. Governments can use interest rates in order 
to stimulate or slow the economy, depending on specific goals and the macro-
economic situation, without disturbing the defence of certain currency parity. 
Monetary policy in a fixed exchange rate regime is imported from the reserve 
currency country, proving problematic in the case of asymmetric economic cy-
cles of two countries. Mishkin (1999) analyses different monetary regimes, in-
cluding the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. The author emphasises the threat 
of importing monetary policy from the country with hard currency in the pres-
ence of asymmetric macroeconomic positions and performances. The example is 
the reunification of Germany, when the costs of unification were financed with 
fiscal expansion, but at the same time, in order to withhold the ongoing inflation, 
the interest rate was raised. Restrictive monetary policy was also transferred on 
other countries participating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism I (ERM I), the 
key feature of which was fixing other European currencies to the German mark. 
In addition to the recession in economic activities and an unemployment rate 
increase, the currencies of countries participating in the ERM I were vulnerable 
to speculative attacks, as speculators expected a devaluation or depreciation of 
currencies. Some currencies were devalued, including British, Italian, Spanish 
and Swedish currencies, while only French currency maintained the same parity.  
The necessity for intervention on the foreign currency market is reduced 
with defining the market oriented exchange rate. Although reduced, the need for 
interventions is not annulled completely. In practice, countries with flexible ex-
change rate arrangements intervene to cope with short-term liquidity crises that Emilija Beker 
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are linked with short term liabilities exceeding foreign currency reserves, specu-
lators' panic or contagious foreign currency crisis.  
The flexible exchange rate explicitly implies the existence of risk. In fixed 
exchange rate regimes, the inflexibility of the parity is assumed, in addition to 
the absence of currency risk. Market stakeholders do not hedge against possible 
changes of the exchange rate in the form of devaluation. However, if devaluation 
occurs regardless, there is the possibility to initiate chain bankruptcy and general 
financial instability. In flexible exchange rate regimes, the economy and inves-
tors must hedge currency transactions: daily fluctuations of the nominal ex-
change rate provide reminders of currency risk inherent in flexible regimes.  
However, excessive variability and currency misalignments are imminent 
for flexible exchange rates. In terms of variability and instability under a flexible 
exchange rate, the real exchange rate is, by nature, more variable under a flexi-
ble regime due to constant changes of the nominal exchange rate. Flexible ex-
change rates could be extremely unstable, especially in conditions of great and 
sudden capital inflows and outflows. If a currency value decreases on the ex-
change market, investors could lose confidence in the subject currency, causing 
sudden capital outflows. The excessive variability is negative also from the as-
pects of aggravated planning and anticipating future economic stakeholders.  
Exchange rate misalignments (See in: Bergsten, 1999; Haggart, 1999, Trade 
and Development Report, 2001) indicate either the possibility of overvaluation 
or an undervaluation of a currency under conditions of market determination of 
an exchange rate. In the world of perfect information, a flexible exchange rate 
would reflect perfectly a currency value. With the decline of productivity in a 
certain country, currency would depreciate and the exchange rate would increase 
(assuming direct noting) in order to follow the real negative change in an econ-
omy. But the experience from the 1980s, when the U.S. dollar and Japanese yen 
were oscillating excessively on the market, indicates the disconnections between 
rate fluctuations on foreign currency markets and fundamental changes in the 
real sector of these economies. The excessive variations are connected with im-
perfect information on financial markets. Traders and investors react to rumours 
- to activity they assume will happen - inducing misalignment impact on the ex-
change rate. The examples of real appreciation under flexible exchange rates are 
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Mexico, and USA. Although the exchange 
rate of koruna is flexible, Czech Republic experienced huge capital inflows, fast 
appreciation and a significant current account deficit. The situation in Poland is 
similar, given their employment of a flexible exchange rate. Having widened the 
corridor in accordance with the ERM II, Hungary experienced a sudden real ap-
preciation and increase of the current account deficit. Mexico resides as the ex-
ample of a combination of a flexible exchange rate with real appreciation and 
constant - although more moderate in comparison to previous cases - current 
account deficit. The combination of chronic current account deficits and over-Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
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valued currency can be found among the developed countries as well, for exam-
ple, in the U.S.  
Scheme 3 represents the above-mentioned positive aspects of flexible ex-
change rate application, including potential threats and conditions for favourable 
flexible exchange rate selection. 
  Scheme 3. Flexible exchange rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed vs. flexible exchange rates: controversies 
It is not possible to offer general conclusions on the base of generally accepted  
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed exchange rates are recommended in the struggle against inflation. 
Shifting the focus from inflation to the problem of economic growth proves 
flexible exchange rate regimes are favoured. Certain papers (Ghosh et al., 1996; 
Rogoff et al., 2003) confirm higher economic growth under a flexible exchange 
rate regime compared to the fixed exchange rate regime with superior inflation-
ary performance. Releasing of monetary policy from the obligation of supporting 
the specific parity creates the possibility to commit to domestic goals, in particu-
lar to more intensive economic growth. While monetary policy concentrates on 
achieving internal balance, flexible exchange rates set external balance auto-
matically and absorb real and external shocks without allowing recourse at the 
output level. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) study relations between eco-
nomic growth and exchange rate regimes for 154 countries in the post Bretton 
Woods era (1974-1999). The conclusion of the research indicates no significant 
impact of the exchange rate regime on economic growth in developed countries, 
while there is a significant connection in developing countries. Developing 
countries using flexible exchange rate regimes record higher economic growth 
Positive aspects of flexible exchange rate regime application: 
Autonomy of monetary policy  
(countercyclic purpose Ö internal balance) 
External shock absorption  
(automatic corrections of an exchange rate in the form of depreciation/aprecciation) 
Automatic balance of payments balancing Ö external balance 
Lower possibility of a currency crises occuring  
Ö   absence of target for specullative attacks 
Ö   hedging from currency risks and elimination of the currency mismatching problem 
Foreign currency reserves are not necessary in the function of an intervention instru-
ment, i..e. instrument of defence of the parity set in advance. 
Potential threats 
Currency risk and excessive variability  
Possibility of an exchange rate misalignment due to foreign currency market imperfec-
tions, deviations from fundamental macroeconomic variables: 
Ö undervaluation → growing share of liabilities denominated in foreign currency 
                              → possible inflation  
Ö overvaluation – deficit of the current account of the balance of payments  Emilija Beker 
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and lower output variability. Investigating de facto applied exchange rate re-
gimes, based on the criteria of the foreign exchange rate variability and variabil-
ity of foreign currency provisions, the authors find that real annual per capita 
growth under flexible regimes is 2,2%, while it is 1,6% for fixed exchange rates. 
Excluding the developed countries from this calculation, due to a lack of signifi-
cant correlations between economic growth and the foreign exchange regime, 
the difference in annual per capita growth in favor of flexible exchange rate re-
gimes is 0,8%. 
 
Fixed vs. flexible exchange rates: controversies 
It is not possible to offer final conclusions based on the above-mentioned advan-
tages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rate arrangements. Many 
of these arguments show multiple aspects. Table 1 contains the review of macro-
economic performances, limitations and the relativity of (counter)arguments in 
identifying advantages and disadvantages of fixed vs. flexible exchange rates.  
A consistent economic policy is indispensable, although the battle against 
inflation falls within the field of fixed exchange rates. Otherwise, the imported 
credibility gets undermined. Conversely, inflation targeting as a monetary policy 
framework under the flexible exchange rate regime brought impressive results in 
keeping inflation under control in practice. However, inflation targeting requires 
a stable macroeconomic environment, knowing the exact relationship between 
monetary policy instruments and inflation, and a possibility to predict inflation. 
The above-mentioned facts indicate that inflation performance could be accept-
able in both cases, although inflation targeting is not a strategy for disinflation, 
contrary to a fixed exchange rate used as a nominal anchor.  
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Table 1. Macroeconomic performances under fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes 
Macroeconomic 
performances 
Inflation Economic   
growth 
Variability Crisis  vul-
nerability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed  
Exchange 
Rates 
 
 
 
Higher credi-
bility of mone-
tary authori-
ties and lower 
inflation. The 
inflation could 
be induced 
with inade-
quate eco-
nomic policy. 
 
Economic 
growth and 
trade can be 
initiated 
through 
transaction 
cost reduc-
tion. Invest-
ments and 
trade can be 
initiated with 
exchange 
rate stability 
and interest 
rate reduc-
tion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variability 
can be in-
creased with 
real shocks 
and nominal 
rigidities. 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
Significant 
risk from 
speculative 
attacks, es-
pecially with 
capital liber-
alisation. 
 
 
 
 
Flexible 
Exchange 
Rates 
 
 
Significance of  
‘imported’ 
credibility de-
creases with 
strengthened 
economic in-
stitutions and 
financial mar-
ket develop-
ment.  
 
Due to shock 
absorption 
and less dis-
tortion from 
real shocks, 
greater eco-
nomic growth 
can be in-
duced. 
 
 
Real ex-
change rate 
variability 
can be trans-
ferred on real 
activity. 
 
 
 
 
Less risk from 
currency and 
banking crisis 
occurrence. 
 
Source: Rogoff et al. (2003) 
 
Economic growth is a field where flexible exchange rate regimes offer supe-
rior results. Thanks to shock absorption and thus weak impact on the output re-
duction, superiority of flexible regimes is assumed from the aspect of economic 
growth induction. However, uncertainty in exchange rate movements, similar to 
daily fluctuations in flexible regimes, could curtail investments and trade activi-
ties, therefore negatively affecting economic growth. Consequently, the need to 
maintain the fixed parity with higher interest rate and uncertainty in successful 
defence could have a negative impact on investment activities. Consequently, it 
is very difficult to offer general conclusions about the influence of fixed or 
flexible exchange rates on economic growth
4. 
                                                 
4 See more regarding the possibility of positive impact of fixed and flexible exchange rates on 
economic growth and the impossibility to define a clear connection between the foreign exchange 
regime and economic growth in Domac et al. (2001). Emilija Beker 
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Due to the nature of daily fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, vari-
ability is emphasised as a disadvantage of flexible exchange rates. The exchange 
rate stability is emphasised as a positive aspect of fixed exchange rate applica-
tions. However, fixed exchange rates do not isolate a country from real shocks, 
but they require adjustments inside the economy. In the case of nominal rigidity, 
fixed exchange rates could often be adjusted, depending on the institutional ob-
ligation of maintaining parity, and show higher variability compared to flexible 
regimes. 
Finally, the currency crisis vulnerability is the key negative characteristic of 
fixed regimes. Although speculative attack vulnerability under a fixed regime is 
significantly higher considering the presence of a specific target, the occurrence 
of currency crises is not excluded from flexible arrangements. 
 
3. Traditional and contemporary approaches to exchange rate regime op-
tion determiners 
 
Traditional approach 
The theory of the optimum currency area (OCA) concentrates on trade and geo-
graphic characteristics of a certain country and compares, from that aspect, the 
benefits of a stable exchange rate (in relation to the main trading partners) and 
flexible regimes. According to the OCA theory, the fixed exchange rate option 
represents a convenient solution under the following circumstances: 
  Significant trade links with the anchor country (countries), i.e. the em-
phasised geographic concentration of trade activities  
  Greater openness of a country, i.e. greater share of trade activities (ex-
port and import) in GDP 
  Small size of a country, positively correlated with openness and increase 
of positive trade effects on the exchange rate stability 
  A country facing similar shock vulnerability as an anchor country (coun-
tries), i.e. the existence of symmetric shocks 
  Factors of production (labour and capital) are mobile 
  The existence of fiscal transfers  
It is the matter of characteristics reducing negative aspects of accepting the 
fixed exchange rate regime in the form of losing the monetary sovereignty and 
maximizing positive aspects through the disappearance of exchange rate risk and 
foreign exchange instability. Monetary efficiency implies a stimulation of inter-
national trade and investments through exchange rate stability and reduction of 
exchange rate risks that are emphasized in circumstances of stronger economic 
(trade and factor) integration in a currency union. The loss of economic sover-
eignty is certainly reflected in the absence of a fixed exchange rate application. 
The independent implementation of monetary, fiscal and foreign currency policy 
measures aimed at the output and employment stabilization is not possible. Sig-
nificant trade integration, high economic structure correlation, fiscal federalism Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
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and capital and labour mobility reduce the necessity for sovereign monetary pol-
icy as a necessary sacrifice of entering into the monetary union or implementa-
tion of other rigid forms of exchange rates.  
From the aspect of the vulnerability to real vs. nominal shocks, it is appropri-
ate to choose the fixed exchange rate regime in case of the country's exposure to 
nominal (monetary) shocks. Flexible exchange rate regimes are adequate in cir-
cumstances of real and external shock vulnerability. Thus, a country decides on an 
adequate regime depending on its vulnerability to real vs. monetary shocks, main-
taining that the significance of real shock (the significance of monetary shocks, i.e. 
inflation as a problem, is reduced) has increased in contemporary circumstances of 
growing international trade and financial integration. A continuation of a flexible 
exchange rate regime acceptance trend is expected.  
 
Contemporary approach 
Exchange rate as a nominal anchor is used as an argument of exchange rate 
pegging in circumstances when the economic authority does not have the indis-
pensable credibility or when there is no confidence of general public in nominal 
stability maintenance. The economic authorities ‘import’ missing elements for 
macroeconomic stability creation by fixing a currency for strong and stable cur-
rency, importing indirectly the recipe of anti-inflationary monetary and fiscal 
policy. The credibility aspect of a foreign exchange rate as a political crutch 
forces vulnerable governments to expansive and political pressures, thereby cre-
ating the inflation to a fixed foreign exchange rate in such a way to limit the dis-
cretionary manoeuvre space for economic policy creators. From the aspect of the 
considered criterion, strong, credible and disciplined governments with healthy 
macroeconomic positions are more inclined to choose flexible exchange rates.  
‘Impossible trinity’ refers to the impossibility of simultaneous accomplish-
ment of three important goals: exchange rate stability, monetary policy independ-
ence and complete integration in the capital market. In circumstances of compre-
hensive capital mobility, monetary policy cannot be simultaneously committed to 
maintaining the exchange rate stability and slowed output fluctuation, which is the 
consequence of real shock caused by increased capital mobility. As deepening of 
financial integration and occurrence of new financial innovations weaken the ef-
fectiveness of capital controls, the dilemma of monetary policy-exchange rate sta-
bility grows in significance. Monetary policy could prevail in the selection process 
because financial integration bears the threat of significant real shocks, and can be 
absorbed only by flexible exchange rate arrangements. 
Balance of payments effects and financial dollarization as the arguments in 
favour of the fixed exchange rate stability are used in financially dollarized 
countries, with significant denomination of private and public liabilities in for-
eign currency, while receivables are denominated in domestic currency. Circum-
stances in which liabilities are denominated in foreign currencies – the ‘currency 
mismatching’ problem - the country tends to fix the parity of its national cur-Emilija Beker 
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rency. Otherwise, significant nominal currency depreciation could threaten the 
solvency of the national economy, defined as a ‘fear of floating.’ Accordingly, 
the expressed financial dollarization is positively correlated with the country's 
inclination to fix the value of its national currency.  
 
4. Structural (internal) and external factors in the exchange rate regime selection 
 
Eichengreen et al. (1998) use the following key variables in the exchange rate 
regime selection: 
  Inflation rate 
  Foreign provisions (reserves) level and capital mobility 
  Labour mobility level and nominal flexibility 
  Production and export diversification 
  Flexibility and sustainability of fiscal policy 
  Level of trade and political integration 
  Symmetry and types of shocks 
  Non-economic criteria 
Eichengreen et al. (1999) use the above-mentioned determiners summarized 
in two key groups: structural and external variables. The structural and external 
factors that are of relevance for the exchange rate regime selection are presented 
in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Flexible  Target zone  Parity  Rigidly fixed  Structural 
parameters  Clear Managed Wide Nar-
row 
Crawling Fixed Currency 
board 
Currency 
union 
Inflation 
- high 
- low 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
yes 
no 
 
no 
yes 
 
 
no 
yes 
 
 
no 
yes 
Provisions/ 
Reserves 
- high 
- low 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
yes 
 
yes 
no 
 
yes 
no 
 
yes 
no 
 
yes 
no 
 
yes 
yes 
Capital 
mobility 
- high 
- low 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
no 
yes 
 
 
no 
yes 
 
 
no 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
Labour mobil-
ity and nomi-
nal flexibility 
- high 
- low 
 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
Production 
and export 
diversification 
- high 
- low 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
no Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
  327
 
Table 2. Structural factors in exchange rate regime selection 
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Source: Eichengreen et al. (1998, 1999) 
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A wide variety of alternatives of exchange rate regime options exist, ranging 
from rigid fixed forms (monetary union and currency board), intermediate ar-
rangements (crawling or fixed parity and wide or narrow corridor), to flexible 
arrangements (managed or clean floating). These alternatives are available and 
possible in stable macroeconomic situations with a low inflation rate, a rela-
tively high level of foreign currency reserves, a high level of labour mobility, 
low capital mobility (incomplete capital deregulation), diversified production 
and export structures and sustainable fiscal position and flexibility. The selection 
is narrowed with the existence of negative or limiting macroeconomic variables. 
A country with high inflation can resort to either relatively flexible regimes, 
defined by clean and managed floating and wide margin corridors, or crawling 
parities, defined by a relatively frequent crawling of the central parity in compli-
ance with inflation movements in the form of minor devaluation. Rigidly fixed 
parities are inadequate due to the unfeasibility to maintain them in inflationary 
circumstances if restrictive measures of monetary policy are avoided. This re-
gime leads to real exchange rate appreciation, degradation of competitive posi-
tions and creating of unsustainable external positions, or a current account defi-
cit. In other words, a high level of inflation is incompatible with maintaining the 
fixed parity, but countries with chronic inflation and hyperinflation attempt to 
restrain inflationary expectations with rigidly fixed regimes in order to retain the 
balance between the internal and external equilibrium necessary for maintaining 
fixed parities. The initial stabilization phase, in which the exchange rate is used 
as a nominal anchor, can be clearly recognized in transitional economies in the 
beginning of the transitory process. However, maintaining the exchange rate and 
establishing credibility of monetary authorities requires a fulfilment of all neces-
sary preconditions of exerting discipline in economic policy, namely a reduction 
in inflation.  
A country with low levels of foreign reserves is limited to regimes that do 
not require significant intervention of monetary authorities on the foreign ex-
change market in order to defend the pre-determined national currency parity. 
With the exception of a monetary union, the selection is confined to relatively 
flexible arrangements, comprised of clean and managed floating with wide mar-
gin corridors. Exchange rates of monetary union member countries are perma-
nently fixed in relation to shared currency and interventions on foreign exchange 
markets are the responsibility of a joint central bank. Therefore, monetary au-
thorities of member countries are not burdened with foreign reserve levels. The 
European monetary union is the example of a monetary union with 12 member 
countries and 12 exchange rates that are permanently fixed in relation to the 
euro. Considering the lack of monetary sovereignty, the member countries do 
not enforce an independent monetary policy, nor do they intervene on foreign 
exchange markets. This situation arises from a lack of national currencies, and 
the relation between euro and the former currencies have been permanently 
fixed. Although sporadic and ad hoc due to the fluctuating euro in response to Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
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other currency reserves, possible interventions are the responsibility of the Euro-
pean central bank. The examples of a limiting effect of insufficient reserve levels 
on selection of foreign exchange rate regimes can be found in certain transitional 
countries in the stabilization phase. In the beginning of the stabilization process, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia chose the managed floating regime, although 
the option of an exchange rate as a nominal anchor was a natural solution based 
on the necessary disinflation process. Due to the insufficient reserve levels nec-
essary for maintaining the fixed parities, the above-mentioned countries chose 
the managed or purely floating regime alternatives. 
The optimum currency area criteria in the form of low labour mobility and 
fiscal inflexibility have a restrictive effect on the selection of an exchange rate 
regime. Mobile labour and fiscal transfers do not act as anti-cyclical substitution 
mechanisms due to the loss of an exchange rate and the presence of monetary 
policy as an anti-cyclic economic policy instruments, as in the case of fixed ex-
change rate regime implementation. In the macroeconomic shock phase, a coun-
try does not dispose of anti-cyclical instruments that mitigate the effects of 
shock on the national economy. In these circumstances, clean and dirty floating 
arrangements, as well as wide margin corridors, are appropriate. 
In the case of capital mobility, the situation is more specific. High capital 
mobility is connected with capital account liberalization, which can cause both 
positive (accumulation import and economic growth inducing) and negative 
(currency crisis vulnerability) implications. The currency crises in the 1990s 
proved explicitly the unsustainability of soft parities in the conditions of high 
capital mobility, or more specifically, of short term portfolio mobility. However, 
if the parity defence obligation is strong enough in the form of a currency board, 
dollarization and a monetary union, a narrowing space for speculative impacts 
presides. Through integration in financial markets, developing countries are con-
fined to the rigidly fixed or relatively flexible arrangements (currency board, 
dollarization and monetary union, on one hand, or flexible regimes in clean or 
managed form and wider margin oscillation on the other hand). ). ‘Impossible 
trinity’ emphasizes the selection of two between three desirable economic policy 
goals and bipolar hypothesis connected with capital mobility, the choice between 
the exchange rate stability with a rigidly fixed exchange rate and monetary inde-
pendence with a flexible exchange rate.  
With unfavourable export and production diversification, that is to say, eco-
nomic dependence on traditionally few export products, the limitation in the ex-
change rate regime selection refers to the application of expressed flexible ex-
change rates in clean or managed form. If a country with negative export and 
production structure with the occurrence of negative external shocks (declined 
global demand for specific products or negative trade ratios) chooses flexible 
regimes, it can react with currency depreciation (price competitiveness im-
provement, increased foreign demand, negative external position adjustment) Emilija Beker 
  330 
and expansive monetary policy, thereby reducing negative impacts of a threaten-
ing recession on domestic equilibrium. 
 
Table 3. External factors in exchange rate regime selection 
Flexible  Target zone  Parity  Rigidly fixed  External 
parameters  Clean Managed  Wide Nar-
row 
Crawling Fixed   Currency 
board 
Currency 
union 
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integration 
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- low 
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no 
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no 
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no 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
no 
Shocks vul-
nerability 
- symmetric 
- asymmetric 
 
 
yes 
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yes 
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yes 
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yes 
no 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
yes 
no 
 
 
yes 
no 
Shock types 
- real 
- nominal 
 
yes 
no 
 
yes 
no 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
 
no 
yes 
Political 
integration 
- high 
- low 
 
 
no 
yes 
 
 
no 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
yes 
 
 
yes 
no 
Source: Eichengreen et al. (1998, 1999) 
   
A country maintaining significant trade relations with specific regions or 
partners shall choose the corridor regimes (with wide or narrow margins), pari-
ties (crawling or fixed) and rigid parities, having in mind the fact that exchange 
rate stability stimulates trade activities. A parity or zone in which monetary au-
thorities have to intervene is in positive correlation with exchange rate stability. 
Conversely, a country with weaker trade integration, represented by higher in-
ternal than external trade activities, and a higher indifference to exchange rate 
oscillations chooses clean or managed flexible exchange rates. 
The  economic structure similarity criteria, also referred to as symmet-
ric/asymmetric shocks vulnerability, together with the previously explained trade 
integration criteria, represent the optimum currency area criterion. Countries 
with similar economic structures are subject to symmetric shocks, and are there-
fore able to maintain fixed arrangements, having in mind that it is less likely for 
asymmetric shock to occur. An asymmetric shock requires an activation of anti-
cyclical instruments, which are blocked in the fixed parity regime. Thus, coun-
tries with symmetric shocks compared to trade partners could choose any ex-
change rate regime. Conversely, the selection is limited to flexible arrangements 
in the form of clean and managed floating or wide corridors.  
Nominal vs. real shock vulnerability is of interest for exchange rate regime 
selection, along with aspects of asymmetric vs. symmetric shocks. Countries 
susceptible to nominal shocks, or unstable money demand and inflation tenden-
cies, choose the option of a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor. The ex-
change rate as a nominal anchor stabilizes macroeconomic situations, conse-Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
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quently reducing inflationary expectations, therefore obligating monetary au-
thorities to disciplined and credibly aimed behaviour, subject to parity or ex-
change rate fluctuation margins. If an economy is susceptible to real shocks, or 
changes in trade ratios and lowered demand for export products, the flexible op-
tion with clean or managed fluctuation is favourable. The exchange rate is an 
automatic stabilizer and corrector of external position, while the autonomous 
monetary policy is a corrective instrument of internal position.  
A country that prefers political integration in relation to specific country or 
region chooses regimes that stabilize or minimize national currency fluctuations 
in relation to currencies of a specific country or countries. The need for the ex-
change rate stabilization, in relation to the politically targeted region, eliminates 
clean or managed floating regimes. In the absence of political aspiration, a coun-
try can choose any exchange rate regime, except for monetary union, because it 
represents the peak of economic, institutional and political integration.     
  
5. Conclusion 
 
Taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of fixed, namely flexible 
exchange rates, as well as structural and external variables, the economic au-
thorities make decisions about an adequate exchange rate regime. The choice is 
additionally complicated by the fact that conventional thoughts in relation with 
positive and negative aspects of application of fixed and flexible exchange rate 
arrangements are relativized in certain circumstances. Conventional thoughts 
point to fixed regime superiority with respect of reducing inflationary expecta-
tions. Transaction costs and currency risk reduction stimulate trade activities and 
economic growth. Traditional views about flexible exchange rate regimes indi-
cate the superiority in economic growth induction due to real and external shock 
absorption. Market mechanism precludes undervalued or overvalued exchange 
rate positions, and thus the disequilibria in external and internal positions result-
ing from misalignment effect. However, fixed exchange rates could be more 
stimulative for economic growth due to trade activity induction, but unsuccessful 
in inflationary expectation reduction if economic policy is not consistent with 
the determined parity. Flexible exchange rates do not always reflect changes in 
fundamental macroeconomic variables, so that the misalignment effect is not 
completely annulled. Characteristics of specific regimes have to be accepted 
with certain reserves, with the analysis of structural and external determiners of 
the exchange rate regime selection. Structural variables point out that the infla-
tion rate, foreign currency reserves, capital and labour mobility and produc-
tion/export diversification affect the selection of the relevant exchange rate re-
gime. Trade integration, vulnerability to asymmetric/symmetric shocks of either 
real or external nature and political aspirations are the external factors of signifi-
cance in the selection process. The country with high inflationary levels prefers 
the option of an exchange rate as a nominal anchor, although high inflationary Emilija Beker 
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macro ambient does not enable parity maintenance. For fixed exchange rate re-
gimes consistent with economic policy, certain levels of foreign currency re-
serves are also necessary. Having in mind that fixed regime subordinates the 
economic policy to the fixed exchange rate defence, the factor mobility is desir-
able to compensate the loss of monetary policy autonomy. Aside from labour 
and capital mobility as substitutable mechanisms of an automatic stabilization, a 
significant production and export diversification is desirable for the fixed ex-
change rate regime selection. Naturally, low inflation, high levels of foreign cur-
rency reserves and incomplete capital deregulation are indicators of strong mac-
roeconomic positions. Strong structural macroeconomic positions decrease limi-
tations imposed on the choice of a exchange rate regime. External factors are 
important for exchange rate regime choice, along with structural or internal pa-
rameters. The country with significant trade integration prefers a fixed regime 
because of monetary efficiency. The country with symmetric nominal shock also 
prefers a fixed regime. Symmetric shock lowers the loss of monetary sover-
eignty, while nominal shock indicates the need for credibility acquirement using 
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. The countries with the expressed political 
aspirations tend to stabilize the exchange rate in relation to a certain country or 
region such that the fixed regime is an adequate option. Specific conclusions and 
assumptions of the application of different exchange rate regimes can be singled 
out.  However, a uniform prescription for the exchange rate regime selection 
cannot be suggested, having in mind relativity and specificity of relevant vari-
ables and key advantages/disadvantages of particular regimes. 
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Izbor režima deviznog kursa 
 
Rezime: Izbor adekvatnog režima deviznog kursa je vrlo osetljivo područje na kojem se 
ekonomska vlast predstavlja i potvrđuje. Prednosti i nedostaci fiksnih i fleksibilnih 
režima deviznih kurseva, sa konvencionalnog aspekta prilično relativizirani, skupa sa 
simultanim, ne i sinhronizovanim uticajima strukturnih i eksternih faktora, permanentno 
se propituju tokom kompleksnog procesa donošenja odluke u vezi sa režimom deviznog 
kursa. U radu je učinjen pokušaj kritičke identifikacije ključnih performansi režima de-
viznih kurseva, sa naglaskom na kontinuelnoj neuniformisanosti i (ne)izvesnosti trajanja 
učinjenog izbora. 
 
Ključne reči: Režimi deviznog kursa, Strukturne determinante, Eksterne determinante 
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